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Abstract* 
 
This paper argues that welfare programs are linked with the destruction of social 
capital, as measured by interpersonal trust in laboratory games. The paper 
employs experimental data for representative samples of individuals in four Latin 
American capital cities (Bogota, Lima, Montevideo, and San Jose), finding that 
participation in welfare programs damage trust. This result is robust to the 
inclusion of individual risk measures and a broad array of controls. The findings 
also support the notion that low take-up rates may be due to stigma linked with 
trust and social capital, rather than transaction costs. 
 
JEL Classification Code: D01, O12, O10 
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1. Introduction 
 
More than ever, social welfare programs are playing a critical role as a policy instrument to help 
cushion the negative impact of market frictions or failures, macroeconomic downturns and 
structural adjustment on the poor. The proliferation of such programs in developing countries in 
particular, such as cash transfers, nutritional programs, educational programs and the like, have 
been heavily employed by policymakers under the premise that they will help the poor transition 
through rough economic conditions. In fact, the abundance of welfare programs in the 
developing world has inspired numerous academic papers that seek to evaluate their impact and 
effectiveness which, in turn, has generated ever-improving waves of new such programs aimed 
at better targeting the neediest. 
Whereas social programs have become widely accepted as a tool to effectively reach and 
positively impact the poor, there is a debate on the issue of stigma related to such programs, 
which has been posed as a possible explanation for the fact that take-up rates tend to be much 
lower than the eligible population (Moffitt, 1983; Levinson and Rahardja, 2004). As important as 
this issue may be, a rather relevant related question—and one largely overlooked by 
policymakers and economists alike—is that stigma resulting from participation in welfare 
programs may well be linked with additional negative externalities. Of particular importance is 
the destruction of trust and social capital, as repeatedly shown in research in other disciplines 
such as social psychology and sociology. In fact, researchers in these disciplines have long 
studied the issue of stigma and its impact in terms of social interactions (see, among others, 
Crocker, Major, and Steele, 1998, and Watson and Corrigan, 2003).  In particular, they have 
distinguished between public stigma, or ways in which the general public reacts to stigma 
attached to a group, and self-stigma, or the reactions which individuals turn against themselves 
because they are members of a stigmatized group (Augoustinos and Ahrens, 1994; Judd and 
Park, 1993; and Krueger, 1996). They have also identified several behaviors associated with 
public stigma, all leading to discrimination, prejudice, and loss of trust and social capital. 
According to this literature, stigmatized individuals are blamed for their handicaps, which are 
seen as arising from problems of their own creation. Thus, help is withheld and avoidance 
follows as people choose not to interact with a stigmatized person, as she is believed to be 
responsible for her lot in life (Watson and Corrigan, 2003). Furthermore, stigmatized individuals 
are viewed as incompetent and thus requiring authority figures to care for them, which also leads   5
to prejudice as well as discrimination (Hilton and von Hippel, 1996; Devine, 1995; Crocker, 
Major and Steele, 1998). Isolation and difficulties in social interactions thus follow, which leads 
to a loss in trust and social capital (Stuber et al., 2000; Watson and Corrigan, 2003).  
Individuals from stigmatized groups tend to be aware of the beliefs about their groups so 
much that a sizeable fraction of them interiorize the stigma and apply it against themselves. As a 
result of this sort of self-stigmatization, they end up suffering diminished self-esteem, self 
efficacy, and isolation (Bowden, Schoenfeld, and Adams, 1980; Kahn, Obstfeld, and Heiman, 
1979; Gronfein, Owens and Wright, 2000). As in the case with public stigma, people perceiving 
or feeling stigmatization are less likely to interact with other individuals, which reinforce the 
negative feelings of the stigmatized to the point that sentiments of marginalization, hatred, 
resentment, and lack of trust become predominant. Paradoxically, entitlement programs that are 
designed to help excluded groups of people may end up further marginalizing them as the social 
construct or social capital of the society becomes structurally damaged.   
Along the lines above, in this paper we focus on the possible link between participation in 
social welfare programs and interpersonal trust as a result of individual stigma associated with 
participation in such programs. To do this, we employ new data from specifically designed 
experimental games, in four Latin American capital cities, namely, Bogota, Lima, Montevideo, 
and San Jose. While the experimental literature so far has placed great emphasis on experimental 
protocols and design, it has not yet put enough attention on the sampling design that would grant 
external validity to the results. In this paper we employ samples for the four cities cited above 
that are extracted following sampling procedures guaranteeing representativeness at the city 
level. In addition, participants respond to a specifically designed survey to capture basic socio-
economic characteristics as well as the type and extent of the social programs, if any, in which 
they are enrolled.  In order to place the focus of our research squarely on our question of interest, 
we explicitly apply a simple, well-known, and straightforward trust game where a “tried and 
true” protocol and methodology has been widely applied, and where the expected findings of 
such a game are considered well established in the literature (Burks et al., 2003; Berg et al., 
2005; Levitt and List, 2007) 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the sample and the 
experimental design. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology applied. Section 4 provides   6
evidence on the possible link between participation in social programs and interpersonal trust. 




The full sample consists of more than 2,000 individuals from Bogota, Lima, Montevideo and San 
Jose.
1 Not only do we believe that this is the most comprehensive experimental dataset in the 
region to date, but also a unique one, since the samples are representative at the city level. In 
particular, the data collected combine detailed socio-economic and demographic background 
with behavioral information.  
The samples were selected using a stratified random sampling applied at the city level. 
The strata were chosen on the basis of education, average family income of the districts or the 
territorial units that make up each city, gender and age.
2 Each experimental session, which lasted 
between two and three hours,  followed the exact same protocol, with the exact same sequence of 
activities as a team of researchers with experience in survey and field methods was selected to 
undertake the sample design and conduct the experiments and surveys in each city.
3 In order to 
guarantee homogeneity in the application of experimental protocols, researchers participated in a 
training workshop at the launching of this project in Bogota during the first quarter in 2007. This 
workshop provided a uniform approach to implementation and related fieldwork details such as 
sampling procedures, writing style and jargon in the Spanish protocol, timing of actions (i.e., 
invitations, pre-survey, experiments, post-surveys), elements to be included in experimental 
sessions and the construction of questionnaires (See Appendix 5 for further details).
 4  
                                                       
1 Buenos Aires and Caracas were also surveyed. However, these cities were excluded from our sample as the 
percentage of the population receiving social programs was too low compared to the other four cities and thus did 
not provide enough within-city variation. In fact, less than five percent of the population in Buenos Aires received 
social programs and less than ten percent in Caracas did so. In contrast, 16 percent of the population in San Jose and 
54 percent of the population of Lima was enrolled in at least one social program. The overall results do not vary 
much when including these two cities, in particular Caracas. Appendix 1 provides information on individuals’ 
participation in social programs and expenditures of countries. 
2 Age was grouped in four intervals: 17-27; 28-38; 39-59 and 60-72. 
3 The day of the sessions the participants were welcomed by teams in each city and at the agreed time sessions 
started. Following the batteries of experiments, participants completed a socio-economic survey. To reduce 
idiosyncratic measurement error due to individuals’ reading ability, the surveys were administered by the 
coordinators of the experiments and supported by a group of pollsters especially trained for these purposes. After 
participants completed the surveys, the payoffs from the experiments were computed and the participants received 
their payments. 
4 A translation of the questionnaire and protocols, originally made in Spanish, is available from the authors upon 
request.    7
Information on the socio-economic composition of the groups in each particular session 
was made as the sessions progressed. The participants met throughout the session in one room 
where they were able to see each other, although they were not allowed to communicate during 
the session. During the recruitment process we avoided having two people who knew each other 
within one session.  
The sessions consisted of four activities each, all played in the same order. For this paper 
we focus on the results of the first activity: a straightforward Trust Game, which was applied 
using the strategy method (Burks, Carpenter and Verhoogen, 2003; Carpenter, Harrison and List, 
2005). As is well known, in this game session participants are randomly assigned in pairs: half 
assume the role of player 1 and the other half, that of player 2. Both groups are simultaneously 
located in different rooms, and identities of the pairs are never revealed, although each player 
receives information on key demographic characteristics of their partners (sex, age, schooling 
level and socio-economic stratum). Both players receive an equal endowment, and player 1 is 
then asked to decide how much of this endowment he or she wants to send to player 2, knowing 
that player 2 will then receive three times that amount on top of the initial endowment everyone 
initially receives. In another room, player 2 is asked to decide the amount to be returned to player 
1 for each possible offer from player 1, from a discrete set of fractions of amounts sent (0 
percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent and 100 percent). Immediately before making their 
decisions, individuals are also asked to predict the decisions to be made by the other player, i.e., 
the amount expected by player 2 from player 1, and player 1’s expected returned amount from 
player 2. After both players make their decisions, the matching of their choices is made. 
Replications of this game around the world have shown that people on average send half of the 
initial endowment to player 2, and that the returns from player 2 to player 1 generate a net 
positive return for player 1 of about 10 to 20 percent from what was originally sent (Carpenter, 
Harrison and List, 2005; Ashraf, Camerer and Loewenstein, 2005).  
Provided that individuals’ attitudes towards risk may be a crucial determinant of a 
player’s offering in this game, we also use information from a related experimental activity 
based on the simple risk games first applied by Binswanger (1980) and later by Barr (2003). In 
this activity (which was the third activity of the experimental sessions), each player makes 
individual decisions over three games that measure individual attitudes on risk, ambiguity, and 
losses. In this paper we only use information that measures attitudes towards risk, derived from a   8
game where participants are given a set of outcomes for six 50/50 lotteries that go from a sure 
low payoff to an all-or-nothing higher expected payoff. The lotteries in between gradually 
increase both in expected value and in the spread between the low and high payoff. Based on the 
outcomes of this game, we classify participants into three groups: low, medium and high risk-





Following the standard interpretation of the trust experimental exercise, we use the offer of the 
first player to the second player as our dependent variable. We include a vector of measures of 
welfare participation as our key variables of interest along with basic controls as described 
below. Thus, our reduced form follows the specification: 
 
i i i i i i W M Z X Offer ε β β β β α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1      (1) 
where Offeri represents the offer of the particular individual i in the trust game. As explained 
above, the outcome used in the empirical specifications comes from the offer of the first player 
in the trust game. In particular, we use the percentage of the initial endowment that player 1 
offered to player 2. Additionally, Xi is a vector of individual characteristics that includes age, 
schooling, gender, and socio-economic level. Vector Zi captures information obtained from the 
experimental sessions, in two dimensions: attitudes towards risk and (pre-game) expectations of 
the behavior of the matched players. The vector Mi contains socio-economic information on the 
matched players: we control for gender and for differences between the matched players in 
schooling, age, and socio-economic level. Our variable of interest, Wi , a measure of individuals’ 
participation in social welfare programs, is defined in three alternative ways: (i) a simple dummy 
variable that captures whether the individual is participant in a social welfare program; (ii) a 
variable defined as the percentage of social programs (out of the list of social programs that the 
survey comprised) of which the participants are beneficiaries; and (iii) an index that ranges from 
0 to 4 depending on the groups of social programs from which individuals receive benefits.
6  For 
example, if the participant is beneficiary of social programs related to only health and education, 
                                                       
5 The exclusion of these control variables among our controls, available upon request, delivers qualitatively similar 
results.  
6 The list of social programs is divided in four general groups: education, health, nutrition and child care. For more 
details, see Table 1. Appendix 1 shows coverage of social welfare programs by country   9
then his or her index will be 2. The exact definitions of these and all the other variables used in 
the paper are presented in Table 1. Finally, εi is a residual term.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics. Table 3 shows simple pair-wise correlations 
including their corresponding statistical significance. Related to the basic characteristics of the 
sample, we find that the average age is 38, there is a reasonable gender balance in the sample (54 
percent are women), 50 percent reside in a low socio-economic level neighborhood and 33 
percent in a medium-level neighborhood, and almost 50 percent of the participants have attained 
incomplete secondary incomplete education or less (Cárdenas et al., 2008).   
 
4.  Findings 
 
General findings from the experimental activities and the survey can be found in Cárdenas et al. 
(2008). As mentioned above, in this paper we focus on the outcomes of the trust game and their 
link to participation in social programs. Table 4 shows the results obtained for the first player’s 
offer when running ordinary-least-squares regressions. All our regressions include city dummies 
and have robust standard errors that are computed clustered at the session level.
7 Participation in 
social programs is negatively linked to the amount offered by player 1, interpreted as a measure 
of trust from the individuals to their corresponding pairs. This result is statistically significant at 
conventional levels, and it is found regardless of the proxy employed to capture social welfare 
participation.  Thus, our finding is consistent with the idea that social welfare beneficiaries are 
associated with lower levels of interpersonal trust, ceteris paribus.  
On the other hand, most of the controls are not statistically significant, with a few 
exceptions. If the participant is female and the second player is male, the participant will make a 
higher offer compared to the case in which the first player is male and the second player is 
female. Furthermore, if the participant belongs to a higher socio-economic-level than the second 
player, then he or she will make an offer that is statistically significant higher. In line with 
previous results by Rabin (1993), the expectation of generosity of the matched individual (e.g., 
the second player) appears to matter as well. Finally, individuals with medium risk aversion 
appear to offer around seven extra percentage points to player 2, relative to individuals with low 
risk aversion.
8  
                                                       
7 Results do not change when using ordered probits instead.  
8 Similar results are obtained when we repeat the exercise at the country level. Based on the last specification in 
Table 4, they are presented in Appendix 2.   10
One may argue about the endogeneity of participation in social welfare programs as an 
explanatory variable for interpersonal trust. At the extreme, one could argue that higher trust may 
drive higher participation in social programs.  While the extent to which this may be the case is 
debatable, such a possibility cannot be ruled out. On the one hand, our OLS results show that 
participation in social programs appears to damage trust; and, on the other, it can be expected 
that more interpersonal trust drives higher participation in social programs. In order to correct for 
this we use an instrumental variables approach where the instrument chosen is the percentage of 
household members that receive labor income. Chances are that households with more members 
receiving labor income will have a lower probability of participating in social programs. In fact, 
the simple correlation between being a beneficiary of a social program, using any of our three 
measures of participation is about -0.3 (statistically significant at one percent). On the other 
hand, there appears to be no reason to expect that households with more working members will 
show different patterns of interpersonal trust in comparison to households with fewer working 
members. If there is such an effect, one may argue that such correlation could go in either 
direction, depending on the type of job, the individual match, or satisfaction with the job.
9 
Finally, we apply corresponding under-identification LM tests on whether the equation is 
identified, namely, that the excluded instruments are relevant or correlated with the endogenous 
regressor. The null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified. Our main results hold 
when using our instrumental variables approach, as shown in Table 5.
10  
We find that our three measures of participation in welfare social programs continue to 
yield coefficients that are negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. The 
instrumented estimators for the role of social programs in trust show higher magnitudes than the 
OLS estimators. With respect to the other control variables, we find that gender and socio-
economic level compared to the matched player, the return offer expected from the second 
player, and medium risk aversion are all still statistically significant. 
We go a step further and explore the linkages between social program participation and 
interpersonal trust for three different domains separately: education, health, and nutrition 
programs.
11 The results are shown in Table 6. We find the same result of negative linkages 
                                                       
9 The simple correlation between our instrument and the percentage offered to player 2 is 0.051. 
10 First stages of all our instrumental variables regressions are presented in Appendix 3. 
11 We do not consider the category child care programs because of lack of variation. In fact, less than two percent of 
our sample indicates being enrolled in that type of program.   11
between trust and social program participation for two domains: education and health. 
Interestingly, the magnitudes differ considerably. However, the concern for endogeneity may 
also be raised for these results.  
As before, we repeat the exercise of correcting possible endogeneity with instrumental 
variables. The results are shown in Table 7. Interestingly, not only do we confirm our findings 
with respect to education and health, but we also obtain a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for the nutritional domain. The IV estimates deliver evidence of stronger linkages 
between social program participation and trust than the original OLS estimators. Based on these 
instrumental variables findings, it can be claimed that they are consistent with the fact that 
participation in certain welfare programs is viewed in different ways depending on the tradition 
of entitlement in a specific society. In Latin America, for example, basic free education is viewed 
as a right, typically written in the Constitution of the countries. In this sense, stigma associated 
with receiving educational programs, and even education-related goods, such as books or 




5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
We argue that welfare programs are linked with the destruction of social capital, as measured by 
interpersonal trust. To do this we employ experimental data for representative samples of 
individuals in four Latin American capital cities (Bogota, Lima, Montevideo, and San Jose). Our 
findings touch on the debate on whether low take up rates are due to transaction costs of stigma 
and provide supporting evidence that it is due to the latter for stigma has been linked with trust 
and social capital, but not with transaction costs. The results are robust to both the inclusion of 
individual risk measures and to changes in specification. 
While, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that addresses the issue of 
welfare participation and social capital, the policy implications of this research may be even 
vaster. On the one hand, promoting higher take-up rates would not necessarily be sound policy, 
as the tradeoff of damaging social capital would have to be taken into account. In the context of 
                                                       
12 For the sake of completeness, in Appendix 4 we run our reduced form (1) but employ the offer of the second 
player. Unsurprisingly, we find that in this case, social participation in welfare programs have no bearing on 
reciprocity although the percentage expected to be received from matched player and the gender (both female) do 
matter.   12
Latin American countries, where social capital is already low, there is a real risk that social 
programs may be depleting such capital. On the other hand, under the assumption that our 
dependent variable better reflects stigma rather than administrative costs, “one-stop shopping” 
for social services would not be advisable.  
In this paper a trust game is held among representative samples in four Latin American 
cities with the aim of testing the extent to which being a beneficiary of social programs is linked 
with a decrease in interpersonal trust. Additionally, our findings may be simply reflecting the 
fact that the questions used to construct our pro-social index appear to be better suited to capture 
the corresponding aims of both the public good game and the risk-sharing game rather than the 
trust game. Furthermore, this paper studies only one aspect of trust: interpersonal trust between 
two agents. It is unclear whether trustworthiness issues may be affected, or trust in the recipient 
of the trust game, which at least in theory appears to be at least as relevant, if not moreso, than 
trust in the sender of the games.   13
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Table 1. Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Individual’s socio-demographic characteristics 
Age  Age of the participant.  
Gender  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the participant is a female, and 
zero otherwise 
Schooling  Number of years of education of the participant. 
Socio-economic level  Categorical variable that indicates the socio-economic level of the participant: 
low, medium or high. Each category was converted to a dummy variable. In all 
regressions, the first category (low socio-economic level) was the omitted 
dummy. 
City  Categorical variable that indicates the city where each participant was 
surveyed: Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, San Jose and Montevideo. 
Each category was converted into a dummy. In all regressions, “City: Bogota” 
was the omitted dummy. 
Percentage of household 
members that receive 
income 
It is the variable used as an instrument for participation in a social program. To 
calculate it, we divide the number of members who receive an income by the 
number of household members. 
 
Matched players’ characteristics (related to individuals) 
Matched player’s gender  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the matched player with the 
participant is a female and 0 otherwise. 
If both players are women  Interaction variable that results from multiplying the participant’s gender by 
the matched player’s gender. It takes a value of 1, when both players are 
women, and 0, otherwise. 
Age difference  Difference in age of the matched player with the participant.  
Schooling difference  Difference in number of years of education of the matched player with the 
participant. 
Socio-economic level 
compared to the matched 
player 
Categorical variable that ranges between -2 to 2 as a result of subtracting the 
matched player’s socio-economic level from the participant’s one. Each 
category was converted into a dummy. I all regressions, the omitted dummy 
was the category “0”, when there was no difference between the matched 
players. 
Experiment variables 
Initial offer by Player 1  Percentage of money offered by player 1 to player 2 in the Trust Game. From 
the amount received by player 1, he/she had five options: to give 0%, 25%, 
50%, 75%, or 100% of his/her money to player 2.  
Return offer by Player 2  The fraction of money that player 2 decided to send at the time of her/his 
decision. The numerator is the monetary amount sent at her/his move. The 
denominator is the initial endowment plus three times the amount sent by 
player 1. 
Risk aversion  Categorical variable that indicates the risk aversion level of the participant: 
low, medium or high. Each category was converted to a dummy variable. In all 
regressions, the first category (low risk aversion) was the omitted dummy.  
Percentage expected to be 
returned by matched player 
(For player 1 in Trust 
Games regressions) 
This variable can take values from 0% to 100%. It reflects player’s 1 
expectation of the percentage to be returned by player 2, considering the 
different set of options he has (that set of options depends on the percentage of 
money gave by player 1). 
Receives any social 
program 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the participant indicates that 
he/she or a member of his/her household is a beneficiary of a social program. 
The list of social programs is divided in four groups: education (E), health (H), 
nutrition, and child care (NC). The list of specific programs included in each 
group varies depending on the country:   17
Variable Definition 
•  Bogota: E: “Familias en Acción”, Labor training –SENA, “Jóvenes en 
Acción”, “Hogares Infantiles” (ICBF or DABS), “Jardines Comunitarios”, 
and “Centro de Educación para Adultos”. H: “Régimen Subsidiado en 
Salud”, and “Jornada Nacional de Vacunación”. NC: “Comedores 
comunitarios”, “Comedores Escolares” (ICBF), “Hogar de Bienestar” 
(FAMI), “Desayunos Infantiles” (ICBF), “Adulto Mayor” (PPSAM), and 
“Red de Seguridad Alimentaria” (RESA).  
•  Lima: E: School uniform and shoes, Textbooks and school supplies, Labor 
training, and PRONOEI. H: “Seguro Integral de Salud”, “Campaña 
Nacional de Vacunación”, “Campaña de Planificación Familiar”, and 
“Control de Tuberculosis”. NC: “Desayuno escolar”, “Vaso de leche”, 
“Comedor Popular”, “Canasta familiar”, “Alimento por trabajo”, “Comedor 
parroquial”, direct food aid, “Papilla u otro alimento para menores”, “Wawa 
Wasi”, and “Cuna”. 
•  Montevideo: E: Textbooks and school supplies, School uniform and other 
clothing, Full time public school, “Asignaciones familiars”, and “Beca 
lineal”. H: “Programa de Educación Sexual y Planificación Familiar”, 
“Vacunación contra la gripe”, “Apoyo económico para control de 
embarazos”, and “Apoyo económico para control de niños”. NC: 
“Comedores y merenderos”, “Reparto de canasta alimenticia”, “Reparto de 
leche en polvo”, “Verano solidario”, and  CAIF. 
•  San Jose: E: “Bono escolar”, Scholarships, “Transporte escolar”, and labor 
training. H: “Régimen no contributivo”, and “Vacunación gratuita”. NC: 
“Comedor escolar”, “Comedor universitario”, “Comedor comunitario”, 
“CEN CINAI hogar comunitario”, “Leche”, “Paquetes de Alimentos”, and 
“Guardería”. 
Percentage of programs 
received 
Percentage of social programs that the first players’ (in the trust games) 
households receive (out of all). If there are 10 social programs listed for that 
city, and the participant’s household received 2 of them, the variable value for 
this observation will be 20. It could take values from 0 to 100.  
Reception of social 
programs (index) 
Index that takes values from 0 to 4 depending on the groups of social programs 
that the first players’ (in the trust games) households receive. For example, if 
the participant is beneficiary of social programs related to health and 
education, then his index will be 2. 
Reception of social 
program related to 
education, health, nutrition 
or child care 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the participant indicate that 
his/her household is beneficiary of a social program related to education, 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Participation in social programs 
Receives any social program
1/ 
1041 45.66  0.50  0  1 
Percentage of programs received by the players' 
household (%) 
1041 5.45  8.29  0  61 
Reception of social programs (index)  1041 0.74  0.94  0  3 
Receives a social program related to education
1/ 
1041 26.47  0.44  0  1 
Receives a social program related to health
1/ 
1041 30.38  0.46  0  1 
Receives a social program related to nutrition
1/ 
1041 15.47  0.36  0  1 
Receives a social program related to child care
1/ 
1041 2.45  0.15  0  1 
Individuals' socio-demographic characteristics 
Gender: Female
1/ 
1041 53.75  0.50  0  1 
Age  1040 37.22  13.40  17  80 
Years of education  1041 10.64  3.96  0  22 
Socio-economic level: medium
1/ 
1040 31.96  0.47  0  1 
Socio-economic level: high
1/ 
1040 16.93  0.37  0  1 
City: Bogota
1/ 
1041 52.36  0.50  0  1 
City: Lima
1/ 
1041 39.34  0.49  0  1 
City: Montevideo
1/ 
1041 6.53  0.25  0  1 
City: San Jose
1/ 
1041 1.76  0.13  0  1 
Experimental variables 
First player's initial offer  1037 40.89  30.25  0  100 
Percentage expected to be returned by matched player  1016 37.13  25.31  0  100 
Risk aversion: medium
1/ 
1041 33.27  0.47  0  1 
Risk aversion: high
1/ 
1041 49.36  0.50  0  1 
Matched players' characteristics (related to individuals) 
If both players are men
1/ 
1025 19.81  0.40  0  1 
If both players are women
1/ 
1025 30.83  0.46  0  1 
If participant is a woman and her match is a man
1/ 
1025 23.34  0.42  0  1 
Age difference (Individual - Match)  1022 0.36  18.42  -54  53 
Schooling difference (Individual - Match)  1025 -0.46  4.72  -15  14 
If participant is at a lower socio-economic level than 
his/her match
1/ 
1021 23.49  0.42  0  1 
If participant is at a higher socio-economic level than 
his/her match
1/ 
1021 20.81  0.41  0  1 
 
1/ The variable is a dummy. We multiply its mean by 100 for presentation (i.e., to see it like a 
percentage).Variables are defined in Table 1.   19

































































-0.1171 0.6822 0.5572 0.7019
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.0296 0.6993 0.6818 0.7440 0.2318
0.175 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.0036 0.4814 0.6887 0.6711 0.2114 0.3558
0.871 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.0304 0.0349 0.0258 0.0266 0.0082 0.0293 0.0265
0.164 0.108 0.236 0.222 0.705 0.177 0.222
0.0224 -0.1036 -0.0730 -0.0842 -0.0656 -0.0686 -0.0385 0.1528
0.307 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.077 0.000
0.0814 -0.1769 -0.1586 -0.1880 -0.1748 -0.0718 -0.1367 -0.0624 -0.1945
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.000
0.0415 -0.0440 -0.1042 -0.0813 -0.0150 -0.0529 -0.1223 0.0073 0.0133 0.0969
0.058 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.489 0.015 0.000 0.737 0.541 0.000
0.0450 -0.2060 -0.1673 -0.2055 -0.1784 -0.1258 -0.1300 -0.0338 -0.0109 0.3389 -0.4269
0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.120 0.618 0.000 0.000
0.2273 0.0616 0.0786 0.0722 -0.0128 0.0926 0.0977 -0.0139 0.0349 0.0409 0.0457 0.0285
0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.563 0.000 0.000 0.529 0.114 0.064 0.039 0.198
0.0578 0.0344 0.0298 0.0341 0.0119 0.0316 0.0081 0.0149 0.0445 -0.0273 -0.0662 -0.0258 0.0042
0.008 0.114 0.171 0.118 0.585 0.145 0.708 0.493 0.041 0.209 0.002 0.235 0.850
-0.0573 -0.0249 -0.0242 -0.0269 0.0005 -0.0342 -0.0112 0.0098 -0.1095 0.0609 0.0374 0.0035 -0.0158 -0.7067
0.009 0.253 0.266 0.216 0.981 0.116 0.607 0.652 0.000 0.005 0.086 0.871 0.474 0.000
0.0461 -0.0133 -0.0272 -0.0165 -0.0038 -0.0236 -0.0279 -0.5479 -0.0799 0.0752 -0.0372 0.0594 0.0571 -0.0255 0.0121
0.036 0.543 0.216 0.451 0.863 0.282 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.090 0.007 0.010 0.245 0.581
-0.0302 0.0327 0.0350 0.0406 0.0521 0.0016 0.0333 0.5990 0.0877 -0.0516 0.0218 -0.0266 0.0181 -0.0143 0.0261 -0.3282
0.170 0.136 0.111 0.064 0.017 0.941 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.320 0.225 0.416 0.513 0.234 0.000
-0.0025 0.0045 -0.0090 -0.0141 -0.0459 0.0298 -0.0056 0.5015 0.0780 -0.0214 -0.0116 -0.0102 -0.0342 0.0294 -0.0118 -0.2747 -0.3924
0.910 0.839 0.681 0.521 0.036 0.173 0.800 0.000 0.000 0.329 0.596 0.643 0.123 0.180 0.589 0.000 0.000
-0.0006 -0.0419 -0.0336 -0.0365 -0.0479 0.0018 -0.0302 0.1211 0.6541 -0.1067 -0.0048 -0.0170 -0.0021 0.0583 -0.0773 0.0040 0.0020
0.978 0.057 0.126 0.097 0.029 0.935 0.169 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.826 0.438 0.926 0.008 0.000 0.856 0.928
0.0019 -0.0931 -0.0793 -0.0930 -0.0585 -0.0687 -0.0582 -0.0209 -0.1223 0.5779 0.0574 0.1247 0.0015 -0.0161 0.0464 0.0010 0.0037
0.931 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.947 0.462 0.034 0.962 0.868
-0.0044 0.0566 0.0674 0.0621 0.0112 0.0666 0.0617 0.0230 0.0083 -0.0885 -0.0661 -0.2954 -0.0067 0.0133 -0.0366 0.0063 0.0241
0.843 0.010 0.002 0.005 0.611 0.002 0.005 0.294 0.706 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.765 0.545 0.095 0.774 0.273
0.0004 -0.0446 -0.0678 -0.0741 -0.0482 -0.0376 -0.0832 -0.0101 -0.0324 0.2032 0.1442 0.3205 -0.0061 -0.0207 0.0281 0.0093 0.0140
0.986 0.043 0.002 0.001 0.028 0.087 0.000 0.645 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.784 0.346 0.201 0.671 0.524
If participant is at a higher socio-
economic level








If both players are men
If both players are women
Receives any social program
Reception of social programs (index)
Percentage of programs received
Receives an education or child care social 
program
Receives a health social program










P-values are reported below the correlation coefficients. Variables are defined in Table 1.   20
Table 4. Welfare Social Programs and Interpersonal Trust   
 
  Dependent variable:  
  First player’s initial offer 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
Individuals' socio-demographic characteristics 
0.1798 0.1578  0.1621  Age 
(0.1394) (0.1359)  (0.1349) 
0.5733 0.6594  0.5517  Years of education 
(0.6273) (0.6093)  (0.6147) 
1.7400 0.3702  -0.7160  Socio-economic level: medium 
(5.6355) (5.0197)  (5.2521) 
-1.2662 -0.6327  -2.8072  Socio-economic level: high 
(6.8544) (6.5415)  (6.6726) 
Matched players' characteristics(related to individuals) 
-1.4480 -2.6078  -2.2387  If both players are men 
(3.5234) (3.5142)  (3.4969) 
-3.2930 -3.2103  -2.9215  If both players are women 
(3.4154) (3.3413)  (3.2716) 
-7.7660** -7.8846**  -8.1188**  If participant is a woman an her match is a man 
(3.5680) (3.5202)  (3.5109) 
-0.0632 -0.0425  -0.0551  Age difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.0882) (0.0874)  (0.0867) 
0.1406 0.1083  0.1379  Schooling difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.4225) (0.4170)  (0.4161) 
5.0622 4.9092  4.1750  If participant is at a lower socio-economic level than his/her match 
(4.3146) (4.2486)  (4.2871) 
8.1739** 7.7101**  7.7364**  If participant is at a higher socio-economic level than his/her match 
(3.8558) (3.8939)  (3.8373) 
Experimental variables 
0.1338** 0.1292**  0.1299**  Percentage expected to be returned by matched player 
(0.0619) (0.0613)  (0.0610) 
7.6280** 7.1610*  7.2463*  Risk aversion: medium 
(3.8655) (3.8710)  (3.8081) 
-0.1738 0.1175  0.1029  Risk aversion: high 
(3.5872) (3.5906)  (3.5306) 
Participation in social programs 
-9.0675**     Receives any social program 
(3.7186)    
-6.0726     Receives any social program * SEL: medium 
(5.7150)    
2.3897    Receives any social program * SEL: high 
(7.0714)    
 -0.6482***    Percentage of programs received 
 (0.2088)   
 -0.3906    Percentage of programs received * SEL: medium 
 (0.3397)   
 0.2433    Percentage of programs received * SEL: high 
 (0.5193)   
   -7.1294***  Reception of social programs (index) 
   (1.6355) 
   -2.0481  Reception of social programs (index) * SEL: medium 
   (2.7990) 
   1.8208  Reception of social programs (index) * SEL: high 
   (5.4054) 
45.3116*** 47.1029***  48.9104***  Constant 
(13.3905) (12.9890)  (13.1465) 
Observations 997  997  997 
R-squared 0.32  0.33  0.34 
F 3.724  3.649  3.891 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are run using ordinary least squares and include 
dummies per session in each city. * Significant at ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** 
significant at one percent.   21
Table 5. Welfare Social Programs and Interpersonal Trust, Instrumental Variables   
 
  Dependent variable:  
  First player’s initial offer 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Individuals' socio-demographic characteristics 
0.2044 0.1420 0.1764  Age 
(0.1420) (0.1398) (0.1386) 
0.3777 0.6400 0.4492  Years of education 
(0.6509) (0.6286) (0.6428) 
-8.3131 -4.7819 -9.3830  Socio-economic level: medium 
(7.7914) (6.6290) (7.0422) 
-13.0830 -8.8794 -12.2753  Socio-economic level: high 
(9.9013) (8.5564) (8.8932) 
Matched players' characteristics(related to individuals) 
-1.6919 -4.1104 -2.7839  If both players are men 
(3.5041) (3.6776) (3.5211) 
-1.0989 -0.7176 -1.8076  If both players are women 
(3.8415) (3.9183) (3.6911) 
-6.4945* -6.7077*  -8.0183**  If participant is a woman an her match is a man 
(3.7399) (3.7017) (3.6052) 
-0.1150 -0.0466 -0.0746  Age difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.1003) (0.0914) (0.0931) 
0.1977 0.0653 0.1649  Schooling difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.4281) (0.4311) (0.4278) 
4.6722 4.6352 3.1773  If participant is at a lower socio-economic level than his/her match 
(4.3961) (4.3867) (4.5024) 
9.5838** 8.4765**  7.6782*  If participant is at a higher socio-economic level than his/her match 
(4.2324) (4.0535) (4.0454) 
Experimental variables 
0.1573** 0.1385** 0.1355**  Percentage expected to be returned by matched player 
(0.0654) (0.0636) (0.0627) 
7.1760* 5.9388  6.6153  Risk aversion: medium 
(4.0389) (4.1091) (4.0336) 
0.0194 1.0656 0.3619  Risk aversion: high 
(3.8263) (3.9561) (3.8481) 
Participation in social programs 
-36.0374**     Receives any social program 
(16.2319)    
11.0212     Receives any social program * SEL: medium 
(13.1795)    
10.8147     Receives any social program * SEL: high 
(16.1358)    
 -2.1279**   Percentage of programs received 
 (1.0258)  
 0.0525   Percentage of programs received * SEL: medium 
 (0.7773)  
 0.8528   Percentage of programs received * SEL: high 
 (0.8963)  
   -18.0172**  Reception of social programs (index) 
   (7.3297) 
   7.4110  Reception of social programs (index) * SEL: medium 
   (6.4707) 
   10.8312  Reception of social programs (index) * SEL: high 
   (8.3145) 
53.7936*** 51.1440*** 57.0808***  Constant 
(13.1576) (12.7517) (13.1758) 
Observations 996  996  996 
R-squared 0.31  0.31  0.31 
F  3.077 3.032 3.090 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. For (1) we use a linear probability model in the first stage; and for (2) and (3), an OLS. 
The predictions of these first regressions are used to calculate new interactions of the variables of interest with each socio-
economic level. All second-stage regressions are run using OLS and include dummies per session in each city. The instrument 
used is the percentage of household members that receive income. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at five percent; *** 
significant at one percent.   22
Table 6. Type of Social Programs and Interpersonal Trust  
  
  Dependent variable:  
  First player’s initial offer 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
Individuals' socio-demographic characteristics 
0.2079 0.1555  0.1808  Age 
(0.1342) (0.1385)  (0.1422) 
0.3823 0.8015  0.7065  Years of education 
(0.6228) (0.6181)  (0.6253) 
-2.0205 0.3473  -0.8319  Socio-economic level: medium 
(5.1664) (4.9342)  (4.7974) 
-3.3290 -0.6704  2.6800  Socio-economic level: high 
(6.5402) (6.6410)  (6.7191) 
Matched players' characteristics(related to individuals) 
-1.2914 -2.2874  -2.0600  If both players are men 
(3.4713) (3.5722)  (3.5935) 
-3.0302 -3.8928  -4.1437  If both players are women 
(3.3228) (3.3190)  (3.3510) 
-9.0125*** -7.7926**  -8.5433**  If participant is a woman an her match is a man 
(3.4725) (3.5541)  (3.5252) 
-0.0734 -0.0250  -0.0444  Age difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.0858) (0.0884)  (0.0917) 
0.1924 0.1256  0.1471  Schooling difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.4149) (0.4252)  (0.4280) 
3.3445 4.6775  4.9754  If participant is at a lower socio-economic level than his/her match 
(4.3103) (4.2542)  (4.4743) 
7.5707** 7.1108*  7.1219*  If participant is at a higher socio-economic level than his/her match 
(3.7947) (3.9632)  (4.0820) 
Experimental variables 
0.1198* 0.1234**  0.1237*  Percentage expected to be returned by matched player 
(0.0616) (0.0629)  (0.0642) 
8.0012** 6.6083*  7.6871*  Risk aversion: medium 
(3.8569) (3.9210)  (4.0490) 
0.2411 -0.8368  -0.0825  Risk aversion: high 
(3.5811) (3.6331)  (3.7448) 
Participation in social programs 
-18.3105***     Receives an education social program 
(3.6164)   
2.9967    Receives an education social program * SEL: medium 
(5.8512)   
10.4907    Receives an education social program * SEL: high 
(18.5734)    
 -8.8676**    Receives a health social program 
 (3.8502)   
 -7.0831    Receives a health social program * SEL: medium 
 (5.8458)   
 4.5354    Receives a health social program * SEL: high 
 (7.1088)   
   -5.8907  Receives a nutrition social program 
   (4.6632) 
   3.3702  Receives a nutrition social program * SEL: medium 
   (7.3507) 
   -11.6221  Receives a nutrition social program * SEL: high 
   (12.8263) 
49.9609*** 45.3708***  47.6632***  Constant 
(12.9853) (16.8059)  (12.7602) 
Observations 997  997  997 
R-squared 0.35  0.32  0.30 
F 3.896  3.398  3.163 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are run using OLS and include dummies per 
session in each city. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one 
percent.   23
Table 7. Type of Social Programs and Interpersonal Trust, Instrumental Variables  
 
  Dependent variable:  
  First player’s initial offer 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
Individuals' socio-demographic characteristics 
0.2529* 0.0230  0.1871  Age 
(0.1428) (0.1523)  (0.1395) 
0.2709 1.0033  0.5858  Years of education 
(0.6737) (0.6406)  (0.6323) 
-7.7444 -12.3334  -8.9700  Socio-economic level: medium 
(6.2608) (8.3597)  (6.6873) 
-10.1033 -17.7236  -6.2472  Socio-economic level: high 
(7.8299) (13.0554)  (7.8832) 
Matched players' characteristics(related to individuals) 
-0.8680 -7.2317*  -5.8349  If both players are men 
(3.4831) (4.2731)  (3.9626) 
-2.4242 -0.7956  1.3304  If both players are women 
(3.5672) (3.9477)  (4.4977) 
-9.4601*** -3.0283  -6.4344*  If participant is a woman an her match is a man 
(3.5917) (4.4639)  (3.7552) 
-0.0986 0.0473  -0.1488  Age difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.0956) (0.0962)  (0.1078) 
0.2204 0.2659  0.0280  Schooling difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.4284) (0.4281)  (0.4360) 
2.1617 3.2347  3.0676  If participant is at a lower socio-economic level than his/her match 
(4.5439) (4.4856)  (4.5138) 
6.9640* 8.8318**  5.7446  If participant is at a higher socio-economic level than his/her match 
(4.0644) (4.0587)  (4.1174) 
Experimental variables 
0.1122* 0.1591**  0.1940***  Percentage expected to be returned by matched player 
(0.0622) (0.0665)  (0.0727) 
8.3751** 0.8612  6.5675  Risk aversion: medium 
(4.0435) (4.9799)  (4.0776) 
0.5820 -2.8423  5.1706  Risk aversion: high 
(3.8158) (3.7763)  (4.9292) 
Participation in social programs 
-38.9696***     Receives an education social program 
(13.3983)    
20.3701    Receives an education social program * SEL: medium 
(13.6222)    
38.6228**     Receives an education social program * SEL: high 
(18.4110)    
 -74.4065**    Receives a health social program 
 (36.5764)   
 7.2548    Receives a health social program * SEL: medium 
 (16.4305)   
 -11.5453    Receives a health social program * SEL: high 
 (20.5782)   
   -80.2860**  Receives a nutrition social program 
   (36.6388) 
   9.0661  Receives a nutrition social program * SEL: medium 
   (17.7580) 
   15.7159  Receives a nutrition social program * SEL: high 
   (22.4047) 
54.5261*** 62.6261***  50.0334***  Constant 
(12.4381) (14.5310)  (12.4257) 
Observations 996  996  996 
R-squared 0.31  0.31  0.31 
F 3.179  3.112  3.043 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. For (1) we use a linear probability model in the first stage; and for 
(2) and (3), an OLS. The predictions of these first regressions are used to calculate new interactions of the 
variables of interest with each socio-economic level. All second-stage regressions are run using OLS and 
include dummies per session in each city. The instrument used is the percentage of household members 
that receive income. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one 
percent. 
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Appendix 1. Individuals who Participate in Social Programs by Country 
 (percentage of all first players) 
 
Variable Bogota  Lima  Montevideo 
San 
Jose  Buenos Aires  Caracas 
Receives any social program (%)  43.7  54.1  18.4  16.4  5.5  10.2 
Receives an education social program (%)  34.3  18.7  15.2  9.5 0.7 9.5 
Receives a child care social program  (%)  4.1  0.3  2.4  0.4 4.5 0.0 
Receives a health social program  (%)  22.2  46.4  5.0  9.7 0.3 4.0 
Receives a nutrition social program  (%)  8.0  28.1  3.6  1.4 0.0 3.7 
Social expenditure (% of GDP) 
1/ 6.4  4.4  5.3  11.9  11.3  9.0 
 
1/ The data are for 2006, excepting Uruguay, for which only 2005 was available. It includes expenditure in 
education, health and housing. Source: CEPAL (Web).   25
Appendix 2.  Social Programs and Interpersonal Trust by Country 
 
  Dependent variable:  
  First player’s initial offer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Bogota Lima  Montevideo  San  Jose 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
0.0792 0.1088 0.0126  0.2953*  Age 
(0.2080) (0.2368) (0.1600) (0.1558) 
0.7907 0.1224 0.5511 0.3894  Years of education 
(0.8590) (1.1669) (0.8625) (0.6563) 
-9.7903 3.5422 4.6196 4.3920  Socio-economic level: medium 
(6.3085) (7.1855) (5.1398) (6.0698) 
-11.7773 7.2318  0.3218  21.4352**  Socio-economic level: high 
(9.2658) (10.9382) (7.0627) (8.3360) 
Related to matched players' characteristics 
-4.2145 -0.4171 -5.8181 -4.9054  If both players are men 
(5.4469) (5.3477) (5.0874) (6.5893) 
4.9027 -13.1266**  -4.3093  -6.6626  If both players are women 
(5.0715) (5.0778) (4.8112) (5.1701) 
-1.9192 -13.9152** -5.0229  -9.7149*  If participant is a woman an her match is a man 
(5.4228) (5.7422) (4.5553) (5.2277) 
0.0442 -0.1092 0.0154  0.1949*  Age difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.1362) (0.1427) (0.1163) (0.1118) 
0.7403 -0.6441 0.0500 0.1620  Schooling difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.5884) (0.7410) (0.5312) (0.5448) 
-0.2333 9.0179 -1.6137  -2.2521  If participant is at a lower socio-economic level 
than his/her match 
(5.7637) (7.9740) (4.4210) (5.0126) 
13.4253** 7.0605  -2.8816  -9.0006  If participant is at a higher socio-economic level 
than his/her match 
(5.7620) (6.3250) (4.8395) (6.6964) 
Experimental variables 
0.1292 0.0701  0.4236***  0.1634  Percentage expected to be returned by matched 
player 
(0.0868) (0.0884) (0.0964) (0.1353) 
9.9276* 6.3496 2.3675 1.2532  Risk aversion: medium 
(5.4771) (6.2371) (5.3201) (6.4005) 
0.7858 -1.0511  -6.3913 6.8272  Risk aversion: high 
(5.0001) (5.8478) (4.7667) (6.1774) 
Participation in social programs 
-11.5174*** -3.2427*  -1.8052  -9.5343***  Reception of social programs (index) 
(2.0295) (1.8347) (2.6257) (3.1057) 
48.6228*** 37.4785** 40.6278***  21.7555  Constant 
(17.8847) (18.2597) (14.4961) (14.8606) 
Observations 270  262  280  185 
R-squared 0.38  0.32  0.28  0.31 
F-Test 5.438  2.664  2.241  3.026 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are run using OLS and include dummies per 
session in each city. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one 
percent.   26
Appendix 3a. Instrumental Variables First Stage, Table 5 
 
  Dependent variables:  
  (1) (2) (3) 







Socio-demographic characteristics          
0.0007 -0.0160 -0.0007  Age 
(0.0025) (0.0410) (0.0048) 
-0.0111 -0.0409 -0.0199  Years of education 
(0.0112) (0.1801) (0.0204) 
-0.1285* -2.4655**  -0.3154**  Socio-economic level: medium 
(0.0698) (1.1314) (0.1238) 
-0.3990*** -4.7640*** -0.7111***  Socio-economic level: high 
(0.1015) (1.6121) (0.1846) 
Related to matched players' characteristics          
-0.0377 -1.8641* -0.1597  If both players are men 
(0.0698) (1.0431) (0.1225) 
0.0900 1.5628 0.1484  If both players are women 
(0.0594) (1.1685) (0.1217) 
0.0330 0.3884 -0.0289  If participant is a woman an her match is a man 
(0.0649) (1.0706) (0.1168) 
-0.0023 -0.0038 -0.0021  Age difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.0018) (0.0310) (0.0034) 
0.0023 -0.0213 0.0036  Schooling difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.0071) (0.1212) (0.0137) 
-0.0188 -0.4153 -0.1272  If participant is at a lower socio-economic level 
than  his/her  match  (0.0757) (1.1299) (0.1425) 
0.1117* 1.0295  0.1190  If participant is at a higher socio-economic level 
than  his/her  match  (0.0676) (1.0095) (0.1227) 
Experimental variables          
0.0009 0.0056 0.0000  Percentage expected to be returned by matched 
player  (0.0010) (0.0185) (0.0020) 
-0.0152 -0.9911 -0.0736  Risk aversion: medium 
(0.0697) (1.1049) (0.1284) 
0.0300 0.8856 0.0834  Risk aversion: high 
(0.0670) (1.1242) (0.1286) 
Instrument          
-0.3904*** -6.0392*** -0.8786***  Percentage of household members that receive 
income  (0.0955) (1.4719) (0.1785) 
0.3088 5.5070  0.9067**  Constant 
(0.2100) (3.3655) (0.4147) 
Observations  996 996 996 
R-squared  0.28 0.29 0.32 
F-Test  8.825 2.734 3.791 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. For (1) we use a linear probability model in the first stage; and for 
(2) and (3), an OLS, and include dummies per session in each city. * Significant at 10 percent; ** 
significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent.   27
Appendix 3b. Instrumental Variables First Stage, Table 7 
 
  Dependent variables:  











0.0023 -0.0020 0.0001  Age 
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0019) 
-0.0194* 0.0041  -0.0018  Years of education 
(0.0100) (0.0105) (0.0073) 
-0.0728 -0.1540**  -0.1096**  Socio-economic level: medium 
(0.0690) (0.0629) (0.0478) 
-0.2938*** -0.2987***  -0.0970  Socio-economic level: high 
(0.0971) (0.0959) (0.0682) 
Related to matched players' characteristics 
-0.0096 -0.0882 -0.0703  If both players are men 
(0.0556) (0.0639) (0.0450) 
0.0522 0.0428 0.0693  If both players are women 
(0.0557) (0.0584) (0.0487) 
-0.0690 0.0581 0.0147  If participant is a woman an her match is a man 
(0.0543) (0.0600) (0.0473) 
-0.0019 0.0012 -0.0014  Age difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0014) 
0.0047 0.0017 -0.0012  Schooling difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0050) 
-0.0800 -0.0302 -0.0299  If participant is at a lower socio-economic level than 
his/her  match  (0.0705) (0.0723) (0.0550) 
0.0641 0.0287 -0.0117  If participant is at a higher socio-economic level than 
his/her  match  (0.0633) (0.0569) (0.0361) 
Experimental variables 
-0.0007 0.0004 0.0008  Percentage expected to be returned by matched 
player  (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0007) 
0.0124 -0.0941 -0.0150  Risk aversion: medium 
(0.0605) (0.0680) (0.0456) 
0.0361 -0.0281  0.0804*  Risk aversion: high 
(0.0584) (0.0668) (0.0467) 
Instrument 
-0.4886*** -0.1586*  -0.1590**  Percentage of household members that receive 
income  (0.0767) (0.0889) (0.0698) 
0.3867* 0.2793  0.1203  Constant 
(0.2010) (0.1909) (0.1440) 
Observations  996 996 996 
R-squared  0.29 0.24 0.34 
F-Test  2.614 2.763 4.135 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. For the three regressions, we use a linear probability model in the first 
stage, and include dummies per session in each city. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at five 
percent; *** significant at one percent.   28
Appendix 4. The Case for Reciprocity 
 
  Dependent variable:  
  Second player's return offer 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Individuals' socio-demographic characteristics 
-0.0300 -0.0282 -0.0285  Age 
(0.0993) (0.0992) (0.0994) 
-0.0471 -0.0173 -0.0263  Years of education 
(0.4350) (0.4293) (0.4317) 
-1.8758 -1.6869 -1.7396  Socio-economic level: medium 
(2.6197) (2.6554) (2.6468) 
-5.2557 -4.7537 -4.8491  Socio-economic level: high 
(4.1169) (4.1052) (4.1294) 
Matched players' characteristics(related to individuals) 
-1.4128 -1.3574 -1.3995  If both players are men 
(2.5960) (2.6114) (2.5975) 
-4.5956** -4.6063** -4.6062**  If both players are women 
(2.2276) (2.2292) (2.2291) 
-4.0768 -4.0501 -4.0688  If participant is a woman an her match is a man 
(2.5359) (2.5452) (2.5420) 
0.0152 0.0187 0.0177  Age difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.0721) (0.0726) (0.0726) 
-0.2539 -0.2474 -0.2456  Schooling difference (Individual - Match) 
(0.3081) (0.3074) (0.3081) 
-2.3670 -2.3830 -2.3676  If participant is at a lower socio-economic level than 
his/her  match  (2.5287) (2.5255) (2.5280) 
4.0033 3.9810 3.9808  If participant is at a higher socio-economic level than 
his/her  match  (2.8608) (2.8559) (2.8549) 
Experimental variables 
0.2629*** 0.2657*** 0.2653***  Percentage expected to be returned by matched player 
(0.0352) (0.0353) (0.0352) 
Participation in social programs 
-1.1034     Receives any social program 
(1.8814)    
 0.0248   Percentage of programs received 
 (0.1288)  
   -0.0099  Reception of social programs (index) 
   (1.0934) 
10.3167 9.6147  9.8033  Constant 
(7.9178) (7.8114) (7.8226) 
Observations  1035 1035 1035 
R-squared  0.37 0.37 0.37 
F-Test  5.161 5.141 5.144 
   
  Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 5. Protocols 
 
The following appendix describes in further detail the protocols followed for the sampling 
design, recruitment, and experimental sessions. This was the result of an original 
experimental design initially proposed by the core team and then adjusted during a 
workshop held in Bogota in January of 2007 with the six local teams that were selected to 
conduct the experiments in each of the cities. The workshop allowed the team to adjust the 
language, payoffs and details to a common protocol that was agreed to convey the same 





In each of the cities we aimed at a representative sample of 500 participants, for a total of 
3,000 people in the six cities. In total we were able to recruit more than 3,100 people all 
together. The samples were selected in the cities based on a stratified random sampling 
approach. The strata were chosen on the basis of age, gender, education, and socio-
economic status of the neighborhood of residence. After the fieldwork we computed 
expansion factors (weights) for all the observations to alleviate minor sampling problems. 
With respect to age we sampled for the following age groups: 17-27, 28-38, 39-59 
and 60-72 years old. The sample should cover roughly half males and half females. Three 
levels of education were used (incomplete secondary or less, complete secondary and 
incomplete superior (college/technical) or more). With respect to socio-economic level (sel) 
each of the cities used the stratification used locally that seemed to be relevant and familiar 
to the citizens of each city. Some cities had three categories (e.g. Buenos Aires), some 
others had up to six (Bogotá). To estimate the quotas to be filled in each case, each team 
identified a reliable demographic census or survey, as follows. 
In Bogota the team used the Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2003 from the 
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE, 2003). The stratification 
(estrato) was used for the socio-economic level of the neighborhood, aiming at covering 
representative samples of the categories stratum 1-2 for low level, 3 for low-medium, 4 for 
medium-high and 5-6 for high. In Buenos Aires the team used the Census of 2001 by the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC, 2001). To identify a socio-economic 
status, the team used data on educational level, medical coverage, qualification if employed 
and economic activity, creating a classification of three levels low, medium and high. In 
Caracas the team used data from the Census of 2001 from the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (INE, 2001). The team also used a socio-economic level stratification used by 
marketing studies in Venezuela based on five groups, and grouping the two highest groups 
given their low share in the total population, yielding four categories (low, medium-low, 
medium-high and high). In the case of Lima the team used a sampling design from the firm 
Apoyo Opinión y Mercado (AOM) which has a mapping of the metropolitan area of the city 
and based on the five socio-economic levels for the city used in marketing studies. They 
identified blocks within each category and visited households surrounding the crossing of 
those blocks. In Montevideo the team used the classification used by the Instituto Nacional 
                                                       
13 They were the result of inputs from Jeff Carpenter, María Claudia López, Abigail Barr, Sandra Polanía, 
Natalia Candelo, and Juan Camilo Cárdenas. The game designs were based on various sources, cited in the 
references.   30
de Estadísticas (INE) for four categories of socio-economic level (low, medium-low, 
medium-high and high) and based on per capita income and unemployment data. Each 
neighborhood was assigned a classification level based on the INE classification assigned to 
the households. Finally, San Jose used census data from 2000 from the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística y Censos (INEC, 2000), and based on the socio-economic classification used in 
the census.  
 
Recruitment and Compositions of Sessions 
 
In each of the cities the recruitment was conducted with the goal of holding a session with 
an estimate of 20 participants in the same room and time. Depending on the availability of 
space, assistants and the schedules available, a team would hold one or more sessions in a 
day, but always one session at a time. 
Each team had to recruit subjects so that they could have at least 4 homogenous 
sessions (in terms of socio-economic level) and 21 sessions of mixed composition with 
respect to income or socio-economic levels. Each team had a group of recruiters who used a 
letter of invitation which had the same content and message, namely, to invite voluntarily 
people to assist to a study on economic decision making which would last between 2 and 3 
hours, and to be held at a specific time and day at the same location being in each case a 
university campus of recognized prestige. Each of the recruited persons received a cash 
advance to cover the public transportation to the campus on the day of the experiment, to 
signal reliability and commitment of the study and its team. The teams had a goal or quotas 
to fill for each session and proceeded to recruit subjects according to the planned sessions in 
the coming days.  Each team used different strategies to recruit subjects. The following 




* Workplace, shopping mall, streets, recreational areas, e-mail. 
 
Each recruited person received a unique general number that would be used from 
then on to identify such participant and follow-up his assistance. At the moment of the 
recruitment they were asked a first set of basic questions about their home location, 
education, gender and age. The rest of the data was collected later on after the end of the 
experimental session. Based on previous experience by the local teams in conducting 
household surveys, we were aware of the potential problems of recruited subjects not 
showing up. Therefore, in each case we aimed at recruiting more people (30 to 40) in most 
cases, to aim at 20 actual participants. This did not impede our study to be able to achieve a 
City  Phone Door-to-Door Other*
Bogota 15.9 78.2 5.9
Buenos Aires 76.7 13.5 9.9
Caracas 84.9 13.4 1.6
Lima  0.0 100.0 0.0
Montevideo  69.3 30.3 0.3
San Jose  0.0 100.0 0.0
Total  41.5 55.5 3.0  31
sufficiently wide variation in terms of the demographic characteristics of our sample as it 
can be seen in the final sample used. There could be concerns, though, about the non-
random selection of more pro-social individuals into the sessions. The previous experience 
of local teams suggest that there are no strong reasons to believe that this non-random 
selection is any different than the selection that occurs at regular opinion surveys (which 
traditionally have non-response rates at around 50%). 
 
On the Day of the Experimental Session 
 
At the start of the actual session a group of assistants was available to greet the recruited 
participants, verify their unique general number and make sure they were the same people 
being recruited. Once the group was gathered, they were invited to the experimental room, 
usually a classroom, were they were read the main instructions about the experimental 
session. During the introduction the subjects were informed of the usual conditions of 
privacy and confidentiality of their decisions and outcomes, and the use of the data 
collected for academic purposes only. Once the activities were explained, an oral consent 
form was read by the experimenter to the group and approved by al participants before 
continuing. Each participant received the forms they would use throughout the session for 
answering the questions and decisions during each of the activities.  It was made clear 
during this general explanation that only one of the four activities would be chosen and be 
paid for all participants in that session. The purpose of this design is to make each activity 
sufficiently important and more independent of a possible portfolio decision-making if all 
activities were to be paid. If only one activity was to be paid, we expect each of the tasks to 
be considered with sufficient care given the significance of the stakes. On average each 
participant was paid the equivalent to 1.5-2 days of work at the minimum wage in the city. 
In the experiment room they were assigned randomly a player 1 or player 2 positions 
for the first activity (trust game). Once they received the first set of instructions (see details 
below) they proceeded to be divided in two groups of players 1 and 2, with players 1 being 
moved to another separate room for the first activity. Once that activity was completed the 
whole group was reconvened to the original room for the rest of the remaining activities. 
 
Summary of Experimental Activities 
 
Activity 1 (TRUST GAME): all participants are randomly assigned in pairs to play a one-
shot Trust Game, with one being chosen randomly as player 1 and the other as player 2. 
Players 1 were brought to a contiguous room and players 2 remained in the initial room. 
They were not told the player they were matched with, they only knew that they would play 
with one person in the other room. To start the game each player receives an equal 
endowment of the equivalent of approximately US$5.00. The player assigned to the player 
1 role must decide between sending 0, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% of her initial endowment. 
The amount sent to player 2 is tripled by the experimenter and given to player 2. Any 
amount kept by player 1 goes to her own final earnings. Player 2 then must decide how 
much from her initial endowment and the received tripled amount to return back to player 1. 
Such amount returned is not tripled on its way back, just transferred. This information given 
is common knowledge to the players. The initial endowments in each city were calibrated to 
reflect the same purchasing power and rounded to simplify the mathematical operations of   32
the players. However in all cases we calculated the percentages in the local currency 
amounts to facilitate the valuation of the different options. 
Players 1 are located in one room and players 2 in another. Identities are never 
revealed, but each player observes the demographic characteristics of the other (age, gender, 
education and socio-economic level) before making their decisions. The game is played 
using the strategy method where player 2 must decide the amounts to be returned to player 1 
for each possible offer from player 1. The results of the game are not revealed to the 
participants at this point but at the end of the game and therefore we do not expect to see 
major learning or reciprocity effects carrying on from this game to the next activities. All 
players in both rooms listen from the monitor a series of examples of different possibilities 
from the game depending on offers sent by player 1 and returned amounts from player 2. To 
make their decision each player checks one of the possible options (0, 25, 50, 75 or 100% of 
the initial endowment) and the decision is then recorder in the booklet that they will carry 
with all their decisions throughout the session. For each of the possible decisions, the 
instructions read (this is an example based on an initial endowment of Col$12,000, and for 
the case of sending 50% of the endowment): 
 
O 3.  You decide to send $6,000 to player 2. 
   You then keep $6,000 and player 2 receives. 
   Player 2 will decide how mucho f the $18,000 plus $12,000 wants to return back to 
you. 
Please check only one of the options with an X on the circle to the left of the possible 
choices below. 
 
Aside from the actual decision, players 1 are also asked to predict how much they think they 
will get back from player 2: 
 
L6. ¿How much do you think Player 2 will send back to you?  
Check with an X on the circle to the left of the possible choices below. 
 
In the case of players 2, each of the possible decisions reads as follows (the example 
here is for the possibility that player 1 sends $3000, i.e. 25% of the initial endowment): 
 
L17. If player 1 decided to send you $3,000, then player 1 kept $9,000 and you received 
$9,000. If this was the decision of player 1, how much would you like to return back to 
player 1 from the $21,000 (initial $9,000 plus $12,000 from your initial endowment)?  
O 1. $0  
O 2. $3,000 
O 3. $6,000 
O 4. $9,000 
O 5. $12,000 
O 6. $15,000 
O 7. $18,000 
O 8. $21,000 
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Players 2 were also asked to state their expectations: 
 
L21. Now, how much do you think player 1 sent you from her $12,000?  
O 1. $0  
O 2. $3000 
O 3. $6000 
O 4. $9000 
O 5. $12000 
 
 
Activity 2 (PUBLIC GOODS GAME - VCM): In this next activity all participants are 
now gathered back in one single room and now play a one-shot Voluntary Contributions 
Mechanism or Public Goods game as follows. The monitor announces that this is a new 
activity, not related to the previous one, and that this one can also be selected for the final 
payment. Once again they are reminded that the decisions are kept confidential and private 
during and after the experiment. They are also asked not to communicate with any other 
participant in the session. The monitor then explains the incentive structure and rules of the 
game. In this game each participant has one token to be invested in two possible alternatives 
P (private account) or G (group account). Depending on the investment decision the 
earnings will be determined in the following manner:  
 
•  If a player invests the token in the private account (P) her earnings are based on two 
amounts of money: 
o  First, the player earns $20,000 (we continue using the Colombian case in our 
examples) from his investment in the private account.  
o  Second, the player also earns $2,000 for every token that the rest of 
participants invest in the group account.  
•  If the player invests in the group account (G) the player earns $2,000 for every token 
invested in the group account by that player and everyone else. 
 
The decision to invest in either account is then written in a slip of paper as the one 
shown below where the player must mark the account she wants her token invested in. The 
monitor also asks the participants to predict the number of people they believe will invest in 




During the activity, and before they make their decisions the monitor explains the 
incentives and possible actions and results with four examples that explain clearly what 
happens if you decide to contribute in P or in G for both cases of a majority investing in P 
and a majority investing in G. Also before the decision is made, the monitor shows in the 
L1  L10 
No. 
Player
How many people 
do you predict will
invest in the group
Account?




Private or Group 
Account  34
board of the room the basic demographic composition of the session in terms of the fraction 
of players in each gender, educational level and the socio-economic status, based on the 
neighborhoods they come from. Once players make their private decisions the slips of paper 
are collected by the monitors and put in an envelope for the session. Once again, the 
participants are not told of the results from their decisions until the end of all activities. 
 
Activity 3 (THREE RISK GAMES): In this activity there is no interdependence of actions 
and payoffs across participants. The activity includes three decisions or steps, namely 
aversion to risk, ambiguity and losses.
14 All games are based on six 50/50 lotteries that 
increase both in expected value and variance. The participants are shown six circles, each 
representing a bag with ten tokens inside. Each token represents the amount of money the 
player would receive, depending on the bag chosen. The decision is to choose a bag out of 
the six and, once chosen, randomly pick one of the ten tokens inside to know how much 
money was earned. Only in one of the bags each of the ten tokens represents the exact same 
amount of money (the risk-free one). The remaining five bags have five tokens with a low 
amount and five with a high amount. The lower and higher values change over the other 
five bags.  The first risk game involves the following 6 circles or bags, again, using the 
Colombian pesos example: The first bag starting in the upper right side represents the sure 
bet of $13,000. Moving clockwise one can observe that the values now move to a 50/50 
lottery of $10,000 or $1,9000, and so on, increasing in the variance and expected value all 
the way to $0 or $38,000 (the last two lotteries do have the same expected value of 
$17,000). The monitor explains with a series of examples how the game works and then 
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14 Obviously they are not labeled as such to the participants, just named decisions 1, 2, and 3.   35
Once the participants have made their decisions in their booklets the monitor asks 
them to make the same kind of choice in the next decision, but showing that now the bags 
have 3 high payoff tokens and 3 low payoff tokens. The remaining 4 tokens are of either 
high or low value but the participants will not know how many of each. For the third 
decision in this activity, the participants are asked to again decide over six bags but in this 
case they are endowed initially with a fixed amount of money and then must decide over 
which bags to choose, which include in some cases losses instead of gains. Using our 
Colombian pesos example, each player receives in this decision $20,000 to start the game 
and then must decide over the sure loss of -$7,000, or lotteries with ranges of -$1,0000/-
$1,000, -$13,000/+$5,000 and so on, all the way to the last lottery of -$20,000/+$18,000. 
As it can be seen, the values are the exact same if adding the initial $20,000 endowment. 
 
Activity 4 (RISK POOLING): In this last activity the participants repeat the first decision 
of activity 3 with one variation. In this case each player chooses whether to form a group to 
share equally the gains from playing again the risk game, or to play the new risk game again 
individually. Once they decide to form the group or not, the total number of people forming 
the group is announced and then they decide over the risk choice among the six possible 
lotteries.  In either case each player needs to pick one of the six lotteries, but the earnings 
are received individually or shared depending on the case. To make their decisions the 




Once everyone has filled the slip, and before they decide over which lottery to 
choose, the monitor collects the slips and announces the number of people who have 
decided to join the group. Now every player should know if the earnings in this game will 
come from an individually played lottery or from the risk-pooling group. Then they are 
asked to mark the lottery or bag they would like to play. 
 
 
Ending of an Experimental Session 
 
Once all participants had completed the four activities, the random selection of the activity 
to be paid out of the four was made, in front of all assistants. If activity 3 was picked (risk 
games) then another random selection was made on which of the 3 lottery games was to be 
paid and then the random selection of whether the high payoff or the low payoff was to be 
paid in the 50/50 lottery. If the activity 4 was picked, then each of the participants picked 




Do you wish to join a Group in which 
Earnings of the Group will be divided
in equal shares? 
Activity 4
L14. Decision to join a group   36
At the exit of the experimental room all participants received a snack while waiting 
to be called to receive their payments and to answer the post-game survey. This last stage 
was made in parallel by all available monitors; each of which took one player’s booklet and 
survey, called the participant to fill the survey and to proceed with payments. Once this task 




The payments made to the participants are explained in detail in the following tables, along 
with the exchange rates for comparisons across cities. 
   Bogota  Buenos 
Aires 
Caracas Lima  Montevideo  San  Jose 
Currency Dollar  Peso  Peso  Bolivar  Sol  Peso  Colon 
Exchange rate 1 US$ 
(Jan.25.2007) 1  2296.81  3.1007  2149.23  3.2484  25.471  537.37 
Minimum denomination 
used for payment    1000 pesos  25 cents  1000 blvs  1 sol  5 pesos  100 cols 
 0.25  1000  0.25  1000  1  5  100 
Fraction of a 1$US  25%  44%  8%  47%  31%  20%  19% 
 
Payments made for each game in local currencies (based on average behavior observed in 
each sample): 
   Bogota  Buenos 
Aires 
Caracas Lima  Montevideo  San  Jose 
Currency  Dollar Peso  Peso  Bolivar  Sol  Peso Colon 
TRUST GAME            
Min. payment possible 
Trust Game  $0 $0  $0 $0 $0  $0  $0 
Max. payment possible 
Trust Game  $ 20.00  $ 48,000  $ 120  $ 48,000  $ 72  $ 560  $ 12,000 
Avg offer Player 1 (%)  0.446  0.368  0.486  0.431  0.496  0.449  0.454 
Avg return player 2 (%)  0.274  0.187  0.264  0.339  0.302  0.284  0.279 
Average earnings            
Avg.payoff Player 1  $ 5.97  $ 12,306  $ 34.86  $ 16,153  $ 23  $ 171  $ 3,612 
Avg.payoff Player 2  $ 8.49  $ 20,528  $ 54.32  $ 18,190  $ 31  $ 235  $ 5,113 
Avg.Ply1/2  $ 7.23  $ 16,417  $ 44.59  $ 17,172  $ 27  $ 203  $ 4,362 
PUBLIC GOODS 
GAME            
Min. payment Public 
Goods game  $0.80  $ 2,000  $ 5.0  $ 2,000  $ 3.0  $ 25.0  $ 500 
Max. payment Public 
Goods game  $23.20  $ 58,000  $ 145.0  $ 58,000  $ 87.0  $ 725.0  $ 14,500 
Avg payment received  $ 9.9  $ 22,504  $ 61.2  $ 28,206  $ 36.3 $  313.4  $ 6,233 
 